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In 1514, the Portuguese navigator Jorge Álvares was the first European to reach China by sea. Just 
over 40 years later, the Portuguese leased Macau from China for an annual rent of about 600 ounces 
of silver. And then, 14 years after that, the Spanish colonized Manila as the hub of their transpacific 
trade. By 1600, trade in Chinese goods was in full swing. China became an export powerhouse, and 
not for the last time. 
The problem for Europeans was that Chinese traders didn't need anything from Europe. Trade with 
China was strictly cash-and-carry—and cash meant silver. In the century or so between the first 
European sea contacts with China and the year 1640, European ships carried something like 100,000 
tons of silver to China from mines in central Europe, Japan, and the Americas. 
The massive influx of precious metal helped transform the Chinese economy from a nonmonetary 
economy based on feudal obligations and barter trade into a monetized economy based on market 
exchange. China had experimented with paper money early on, but even the government did not 
accept that paper as payment for its own taxes. And so the monetization of China's large economy 
required boatloads of foreign money—just what Europe sent. 
Between 1568 and 1644, the price of silver in China (relative to gold) eased by 50 percent. By 1580, 
there was enough silver in the economy for the Ming dynasty to convert a variety of feudal labor and 
crop levies into modern taxes payable in coin. Wages and prices rose and rose as silver money 
became more plentiful. 
Soon, China was the manufacturing workshop of the world, at least so far as the sailing technology 
of the time made that possible. The country’s two major centers of export-oriented production were 
the Pearl River Delta (modern Guangzhou, Hong Kong, and Macau) and the Yangtze River Delta 
(modern Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Suzhou). Chinatowns sprang up throughout the Spanish New 
World, with Spanish colonial authorities warning that Chinese imports were undercutting home 
industries. 
Around 1640, though, the party ended; trade crashed and poor harvests brought famine to northern 
China. The price of silk declined by 50 percent as producers scrambled to find buyers for their 
output. Meanwhile, the price of food shot up, so the deflation of the factory sector was 
accompanied by a rising cost of living for ordinary people. Soon, rebellions broke out, Manchu 
invaders took Beijing, and the Ming dynasty fell. It was replaced by the Qing dynasty, which would 
rule China until the early twentieth century. 
Of course, trade in Chinese goods didn't come to an end in 1640. What came to an end that year was 
superprofitable arbitrage resulting from the collision of two different economic systems. Before 
1640, Europe's glut of cheap New World silver intersected with China's seemingly insatiable appetite 
for silver money to drive massive wealth creation on both sides. Trade with China wasn't just 
profitable; it was sensational. But after 1640, the global value of silver equalized and China became 
just another port of call in the international trading system. Silver still flowed into China, but so did 
ginseng, furs, and opium. Tea, silk, and porcelain continued to flow out. 
THE SECOND BOOM 
Just as in the 1600s, the basic underlying logic of China's economic boom after 1980 was the import 
of money in exchange for the export of goods.  China's first integration with the West in the late 
1500s and early 1600s looked an awful lot like China's second integration with the West between 
1980 and 2010. Both resulted in massive opportunities for arbitrage from the connecting of two 
previously isolated economies. Both resulted in massive profits for Western traders and Chinese 
merchants. And both petered out once the Chinese economy was fully inflated by Western money. 
In the 1970s, China was an isolated country with an economy based mainly on communal obligations 
and barter trade. Most people received most everything they needed from their work units. Rural 
people lived off the land, remitting a portion of their produce to the government. Urban people lived 
in factory housing, ate in factory cafeterias, and worked in factory uniforms. 
Money was a scarce commodity in Communist China, and Western hard currency was rarer still. 
After 1980, China imported massive quantities of hard currency in the form of foreign direct 
investment and central bank accumulation of U.S. dollars. It exported consumer goods in exchange. 
Just as in the 1600s, the basic underlying logic of China's economic boom after 1980 was the import 
of money in exchange for the export of goods. This influx of money supported the full 
remonetization of the Chinese economy. Goods and services that the state or the work unit had 
previously provided now had to be bought in the marketplace. 
China's GDP per capita grew by a factor of 13 between 1980 and 2010. If this sounds too good to be 
true, that's because it is too good to be true. China's economy did experience enormous growth 
after 1980, but no economy really grows by a factor of 13 in just 30 years. China's recorded growth is 
partly due to true economic progress and partly due to the monetization of previously nonmonetary 
relationships. 
Today, both sources of recorded GDP growth are disappearing. Before 2007, China's foreign 
currency reserves were large in absolute terms but more or less in line with those of many other 
developing countries. When the global financial crisis struck, China's reserves ballooned. They have 
remained high ever since. 
This suggests that China's once insatiable demand for hard currency has finally run its course. 
Investment flows tell the same story: China is now a net exporter of foreign direct investment. After 
three decades of massive monetary inflows, the Chinese economy is fully inflated and fully 
monetized. It's 1640 all over again. 
Now that the easy money is gone, China will have to chase the hard money to finance its future 
growth. So far, China's leaders have shown little appetite for the kinds of public-spirited sacrifices 
that have made the United States what it is today. True growth in China's underlying economic 
output is slowing thanks to a falling working-age population, a degraded environment, and 
inadequate political institutions. China is converging with Brazil, Russia, and Turkey, not with the 
United States, Europe, and Japan. China's monetary saturation only reinforces this trend. As China's 
economy becomes more and more open, money is flowing out, not in. 
The years after 1640 were ones of great turmoil in China, culminating in famine, revolution, and 
invasion. Today's Chinese state is much more robust than the Ming dynasty was. There will be no 
famine, revolution is unlikely, and no one is in a position to invade China. But the money-fueled 
profits party is over. From now on, it will be "business as usual" in China. 
China's new challenge is to develop the social and political institutions that will allow it to continue 
improving the lives of its people. There is no magic formula. A good start would be to implement a 
more effective national income tax to replace China's hodgepodge of unreliable revenue sources. 
Continued growth requires continued investment in human and physical infrastructure, and that 
requires taxes. 
Now that the easy money is gone, China will have to chase the hard money to finance its future 
growth. So far, China's leaders have shown little appetite for the kinds of public-spirited sacrifices 
that have made the United States what it is today. As countries such as Brazil, Russia, and Turkey 
illustrate, it is possible for leaders to live quite well in stagnant economies. More than a billion 
people have to hope that China's leaders will rise to the challenge. 
  
 
 
 
 
